By Stephanie Avalos and Mewerick Mozza
The use of
Depleted Uranium added to munitions was envisioned since 1943 when the
Manhattan Project was in the works, and the outline for the project
contemplated not only the development of the atomic bomb, but also the uses
that the residual waste could have in warfare. After the World Wars it was well
know that radioactive materials were easily friable and produced fine
radioactive dust that penetrated clothing, gas masks and even skin,
contaminating primarily the kidneys, lungs and the blood stream; with the
capacity to kill and cause illnesses very quickly. Enriched radioactive
material is also a terrain contaminant, which could be used in warfare to
destroy populations by contaminating water supplies and agricultural land with
radioactive dust (Paulison 1). The social and
environmental negligence surrounding the use of Depleted Uranium presents
intolerable social costs as well as legal questions that we wish to explore
further through a research study that examines political and legal perspectives.
In this
analysis we will argue that because Depleted Uranium is a radioactive waste
that when employed in munitions vaporizes and infiltrates the environment
creating a hazard for the human beings belligerent in the conflict as well as
for the bystanders, it causes significant and unnecessary harm to the people;
and following the statutes in international law DU should be banned or at least
strongly restricted.
The first
section is a brief recapitulation of existing information on DU, as it relates
to its effects and long-term impact. Secondly, we will look at the politics
behind the blocked efforts to ban Depleted Uranium, in relation to Depleted
Uranium disposal and mainly the exposure of war veterans and civilians to
radioactive particles during the Gulf-Wars, as well as in the Balkan conflict.
In the last section we will discuss the need for principles of International
Law that can provide limitations to such belligerent mechanisms of destruction,
which cause long term social suffering and death.
Uranium in its natural state is a mix of three isotopes
U234, U235, U238. The U235 isotope
represents only about 1% of the element’s mass, but contributes 40% of the
radioactivity. Uranium 235 is also the only isotope in nature that is fissile
with thermal neutrons, so it can be separated to develop a more radioactively
enhanced product known as enriched uranium. Enriched uranium is highly
radioactive, and it is a critical component for civil nuclear power generation,
as well as for nuclear weapons. The toxic waste that results from the uranium
enrichment process is known as depleted uranium (DU). DU constitutes about
99.284% of uranium’s total mass, and is still 60-70% as radioactive as the
natural element (A. Bleise,
Properties, use and health effects of depleted uranium: a general overview).
After depleting large amounts of Uranium, governments were
left with stockpiles of toxic waste that had to be stored in special facilities
given its radioactive and volatile nature (Beckett 3-4). Given that Uranium
isotopes in Depleted Uranium have a half-life[1]
of 4.5
billion years, countries like the United States that have tons of radioactive
waste have to store lethal, radioactive toxic waste until its radioactive life
expires. However, instead of facing the risks of storing it, the US has opted
to fire DU into other countries’ backyard during war. Back in 1968 the United
States developed a system of weapons that employed Depleted Uranium, and then
later sold these weapons to approximately 30 countries around the world, but it
was not until the first Gulf War, that the United States and their allies used
them in combat (Paulison 1).
When added to munitions, Depleted Uranium is extremely thick
and dense and if fired at high speeds it can pierce through tank armor and thick
concrete walls. DU is a potent weapon that “burns fiercely and rapidly and
carbonizes everything in its way while it is transformed into fine uranium
oxide powder,” (Shah 1) which becomes
aerosol-like and when mixed with air can be ingested through the nose and
mouth.
Most research on the health effects of exposure scenarios of
DU in the Gulf conclude that DU dust is unlikely to cause any significant
physical health effects in the general population. It is surprising that the U.S.
government has spent roughly $440 million on Gulf War health research, since
1994, and still no conclusive evidence has been produced that is able to
provide certainty rather than likelihood about its effects and liabilities.
Still more surprising is that in recent years, following the invasion, spending
has declined and DU appears to be exonerated when increased cases of cancer and
birth defects have surfaced among veterans and their descendants, as well as
among the Iraqi civilian population (Sullivan).
Radiation is present in nature, and at low levels it is known
as "background.” DU, however, is a highly concentrated radiation emissary.
When “DU smashes at twice the speed of sound against metal, it burns and
pulverizes, becomes toxic and releases radioactive dust that can soar in the
heat column of a flaming tank and waft for miles in the desert wind” (Peters 3). Radiation detectors
taken to battlefield areas after Gulf War I register from 35 to 50 times the
normal background radiation in southern Iraq. Former Pentagon DU expert, Doug
Rokke, reports: "It's hot forever. It doesn't go away. It only disperses
and blows around in the wind" (Peters 3; Doug Rokke).
Unlike other war related exposures and effects there are
very few epidemiologic studies focused on the effects of DU, however, the
extent to which multi-symptom illness is affecting veterans may be associated
with DU exposures during deployment. The International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) reported that several hundred thousand military personnel that was
within 100-200 kilometers of the southern region of Iraq and the main combat
cities: Basra, Fallujah and Mosul, “may have inhaled, ingested, or incurred in
wound contamination by depleted uranium contaminated dust.”
One of the few responses of the US government to the
possible effects of the hazardous exposure to DU, has been to focus health and
risk assessments primarily on kidney function, as well as lung and bone
cancers; neglecting all other possible risks that could be the cause of the
multi-symptom illnesses displayed by war veterans who may have come in contact with
DU. Although most uranium that enters the body is excreted through the
digestive system and kidneys, veterans who have served in the Gulf said that
while they were in service they also began experiencing headaches, chest pains,
diarrhea, and heart related pains after being involved in shooting rounds;
which suggests that broader epidemiologic studies could reveal additional
damaging effects of DU and possibly link it to Gulf-War Illness (Research
Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veteran's Illnesses 86-87).
There are no official records that quantify the amount of DU
that has been left behind in the Gulf since 1990, but alternative sources
coincide in claiming that about 320 tons of DU were fired in Iraq, mostly concentrated
in the southern region where the first Gulf War was mainly fought. The Research
and Development Corporation (RAND), reports that their research of the
wide-ranging examination of scientific literature on Gulf War syndrome has
found no conclusive results on the effects of DU in veterans. But even
from this perspective, the relatively short-term exposure to small amounts of
DU that veterans have experienced in the Gulf Wars contrasts to the daily
exposure that civilians suffer; which could offer more conclusive support
against the use of DU. Medical journals and news-articles report an increased
incidence of congenital anomalies in the southern province of Basrah, and an
increase in the number of cancer cases (Beckett).
Dr. Rosalie Bertell led UN medical commissions that studied
low-level radiation over the course of 30 years. She found that DU damages DNA
and causes cell mutations, which lead to cancer. These particles are absorbed
by the different body fluids and travel through the body damaging more than one
organ. Body’s communication systems break down and vital organs have
malfunctions (Paulison 1)
Furthermore, there is strong anecdotal evidence of increased
health issues and birth anomalies that were previously only known to Iraqi doctors
through textbooks (Beckett 6).
Dr. Jawad Al-Ali the director of the
Oncology Center at the largest hospital in Basrah back in 2003 reported
recounted that strange medical phenomena have developed in Basrah such as
double and triple cancers in the same patient and entire families with cancer (Paulison 1)
Another variable to consider is the
increased vulnerability of children to DU exposure. Given that most of the
radiation that is internalized is ingested, the immature gut, which is more
permeable, absorbs it more effectively than would an adult gut.
Dr. Alim Yacoub of Basra University conducted a study of
illnesses in children in the Basra bombed area with DU during the first Gulf
War. He found that from 1990-1999 there was a 24% rise. With conditions as
violent and chaotic as they are now, after the recent invasion only a small
number of cancer and birth defects are being recorded (Paulison 1).
One study
performed since the invasion, shows that of 1425 people “over 5% of the
children are born with congenital abnormities, and over 2% are stillborn” (Beckett 6)
The limitations of the existing studies hinder efforts to
interpret the data that exists, scattered as pieces of a puzzle that seeks to
produce a conclusive response. “Deliberate denial and delay of medical
screening and consequent medical care of not only U.S. friendly fire casualties
who inhaled, ingested, and had wound contamination but all others with verified
or suspected internalized exposure, makes actually knowing what has occurred
difficult” (Doug Rokke).
Although no conclusive studies have been produced by
comparing the different instances in which DU has been a source of concern on or
off the battlefield, one internal study was conducted by the U.S. on
individuals living near a DU munitions plant in Colonie New York that were
likely to have had a significant DU aerosol inhalation
exposure. No official report with a
direct link between DU and ill health was ever released, but the government
authorities closed the DU munitions factory because airborne contamination
levels exceeded 150 microcurie per month and contamination extended to
populated areas 26 miles away. The released toxicity of the Colonie plant was
equivalent to 1 or 2 DU shells per month, while 35 tones of DU have been released
just in southern Iraq (Parrish).
Another important case can be made about the 14 tons of
DU-containing munitions that were used during the Balkan conflicts. There was a
perceived increase of leukemia cases among European soldiers and individuals
who lived, or were exposed to, areas where NATO forces used DU munitions in the
Balkans. However, official studies reported that there was in fact no increased
incidence of cancer among UN soldiers, or British veterans. One single study
reported increased levels of uranium in a small cohort of US soldiers, and an excess
of bone cancer among Danish troops and a slight increase in the rate of all
cancers among Swedish troops who served in the region; but it did not provide a
report of symptoms or other health parameters that would allow case
correlations to be made in the future (Research Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veteran's
Illnesses 88).
Today, 20 years after soldiers and civilians have been
exposed to DU in multiple sites on different situations and conflicts, there is
a recognizable development of adverse health effects amongst this entire group.
The proliferation of DU added munitions and the health effects that have been
observed throughout the time that it has been employed should have led to a
thorough investigation followed by complete medical care, which has been denied
for so many years.
Depleted Uranium training programs were completed, approved
and ready to be implemented back in 1996 by the U.S., Germany, Canada, Great
Britain, and Australia military officials; however, in 2001 the Italian forces
that fought for NATO in Kosovo confirmed that the U.S. Department of Defense
did not provide them this material.
Furthermore, the DOD to this day has not dedicated time and effort into
training foreign soldiers serving in the Gulf with DU instruction as required
for U.S. military personnel (Doug Rokke).
The
first Gulf War introduced another form of warfare, one with the capacity to destroy
on multiple levels and to carry long-lasting social effects. The debate over
the causes and responsibilities for the multi-symptom illness that Gulf War
veterans have endured for over two decades, suggests that there is a deliberate
intention by government authorities to suppress the role of DU in causing or
contributing to Gulf-War related symptoms.
In
countries with a widespread of DU affected population, such as Iraq, the remediation
of these hazards relies on politicized efforts to gain international sympathy.
Individual and independent opponents to DU lack the means to make an accurate
assessment of the post-war health crises. First because of the lack of quantitative
data to support the estimated remnant of DU in the affected countries, and secondly
because not many countries around the world have the laboratory capacity to
confirm a direct link between DU and the victim’s profound health problems (Peters).
The
Pentagon insists that “Any tie between radioactive rounds and cancer, birth
defects and other anomalies in Iraq, they say, is ‘misinformation’ spread by
Saddam Hussein” (Peters 3). Pentagon officials’
attempt to suppress the risks and effects of DU, appears to have less to do
with scientific facts and studies than with continuing to use it as a weapon
and protecting the U.S. against having to make compensation payments. Because
DU packs more mass into less space it minimizes air friction and increases its
kinetic energy, making these weapons more efficient armor penetrators and
consequently, also as an effective armoring-material against incoming fire
attacks: “The DOD reports that no American tanks protected by DU armoring were
penetrated by Iraqi fire” (Research Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veteran's
Illnesses 85) In Iraq, however, the high incidence of
post-war illnesses is undeniable: "People tell funny stories, they call it
the 'Strange Disease" (Peters 3).
In
spite of the ongoing debate, the undeniably long list of poisoned locations and
facilities reveal much about the reality of DU contamination. Coping with the hazards of DU exposure on
both social and environmental levels is virtually impossible with the lack of supporting
data to understand the amounts of DU deployed onto warzones and in the context the
endless deserts of the Gulf, where the wind has spread DU-dust beyond traceable
limits. Even in the case that the achieved boundary identifications were
sufficient to allow for remediation to occur, the cost of such a project, just
in the Gulf, would be unaffordable. “Recently declassified Army documents
reveal that sixteen vehicles [used during the Kuwait war] were shipped to a new
$4 million decontamination facility built at Snelling, South Carolina, where
they were scraped and etched with acid to remove DU traces. Despite such rigorous
efforts, six vehicles treated at Snelling were still too hot. They had to be
buried in a low-level radioactive waste dump” (Peters 4)
As
far back as 1997, Dr. Durakovic, the former VA nuclear medicine chief said:
"We know what uranium does to the body, and we know what we should expect
from the Gulf War experience.[…][T]he battlefields of the future will be unlike
any [others] in history. Due to the delayed health effects from internal contamination
from uranium, injury and death will remain lingering threats to 'survivors' of
battle for decades into the future. The battlefield will remain a killing zone
long after the cessation of hostilities" (Peters 5).
DU
must be seen as having a primary effect and a secondary effect. The primary
effect principle of weapons are clearly codified in the St. Petersburg Declaration,
the Hague Regulations and the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention
(Art. 35(2)) (Mc Donald, Kleffner and Toebes). The primary aim of
DU is that its “density makes DU a very good armor, as well as an excellent
armor penetration, and its attraction is augmented by a plentiful, and
inexpensive, supply” (Beckett).
The secondary effect of DU is caused by its incendiary nature “this is because
DU burns fiercely and rapidly and carbonizes everything in its way while it is
transformed into fin uranium oxide powder” (Shah 1).
In order to present a case for DU to be banned, the secondary effects must be
also taken into account when assessing a weapon’s legality.
As
previously exposed, depleted uranium affects the health of human beings. “The
blueprint for DU weapons is in a 1943 declassified document from the Manhattan
Project” (Paulison).
Therefore, DU has been in the American military for over six decades. “The
first DU weapons system was developed for the Navy in 1968;” which sought as an
objective to employ the “fine radioactive dust which would penetrate all
protective clothing, gas masks, filters or skin contaminating the lungs and
blood, thereby killing or causing illnesses, which could be quickly” (Paulison). The US military envisioned
a weapon with deadly first effects as well as deadly long term secondary
effects. DU was also “recommended as a permanent terrain contaminant, which
could be used to destroy populations by contaminating water supplies and
agricultural land with radioactive dust” (Paulison).
DU added munitions acted as a precipitating piece of the domino effect given that the first
objective of the military was to damage the countries energy system by using
the DU capacity to perforate thick walls. Consequently fulfilling a second
objective to maintain the Iraqi people dependent (for their nourishment) upon
the Coalition Forces headed by the U.S.A.
Currently
International Law bases the banning of weapons either on nations voluntarily not
employing certain weapon on the primary effects of the weapon. The first
country to ban DU containing weapons was Belgium in 2007 (ICBUW).
In 2007 the “UN General Assembly pass a resolution highlighting serious health
concerns over DU” (ICBUW). Additionally in
December 2008, 141 states in the UN General Assembly “ordered” the WHO, the
IAEA, and the UN Environment Programme “to update their positions on the
long-term health and environmental threat that uranium weapons pose” (ICBUW). In other words,
there is a worldwide chorus behind greater monitoring of the employment of
DU.
Currently,
DU is not prohibited by any treaty because it does not possess the qualities
and properties to be banned or restricted under the principles that control
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. DU does not qualify as a biological
weapon under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) since it does not fit the
definition which clearly states:
Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins
whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that
have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes (Unit).
DU
is the waste product of enriched uranium extraction process; therefore, given
that the definition clearly states “microbial or other biological agents” DU
does not qualify. Furthermore, the term “agents,” which refers to “living
organisms or infective material (or their synthetic equivalent) obtained from
them, that multiply inside the person, animal or plant attacked” further
removes DU from being banned or restricted through a biological weapons
approach (Mc Donald, Kleffner and Toebes). Additionally, DU
cannot be banned through a toxin approach, because even though toxins are not
defined by the BWC they are produced by microbial or biological agents (Mc Donald, Kleffner and Toebes). The biological
nature of toxins hinders an appeal to ban DU by that means.
Neither
can DU be considered a chemical weapon under the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) article 1, which defines the meaning of this kind of weapon as being “toxic
chemicals and their precursors” (CWC).
The CWC defines a “precursor” in article 3 as being “Any chemical reactant
which takes part at any stage in the production by whatever method of a toxic
chemical” (CWC).
DU does not qualify for restriction under the CWC because DU is simple a waste
product and not a toxic chemical or one of its precursors.
Another
setback in banning or restricting DU is that DU munitions are classified as a conventional
weapon. Thus, DU cannot fall into the restriction of Protocol III of
the 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention because the explosion or
ignition of DU, by which particles may be inhaled or embedded in humans, is a
consequence of the impact and not the direct aim of the weapon. Additionally, article
1(1)(b)(ii) of Protocol III states that:
Incendiary
weapons do not include munitions designed to combine penetration, blast or
fragmentation effects with an additional incendiary effect, such as
armor-piercing projectiles, fragmentation shells, explosive bombs and similar
combined effects munitions in which the incendiary effect is not specifically
designed to cause burn injuries to persons, but to be used against military
objectives, such as armored vehicles, aircraft and installations or facilities” (Pike).
DU
is an armor-piercing projectile that is used against military objectives, and
cannot be banned because it passes the test of military necessity, and the
hazards to people and the environment are part of the secondary effects of DU.
Finally,
DU cannot be restricted as a nuclear weapon under the definition of Protocol
III of the Modified Brussels Treaty of 1954 as weapon directly “capable of mass
destruction, mass injury or mass poisoning” (Mc Donald, Kleffner and Toebes). Additionally
article I(c) of the of the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free
Zone defines a nuclear weapon as “any explosive device capable of releasing
nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner” (Mc Donald, Kleffner and Toebes). DU’s main purpose
is to penetrate the armor vehicles and destroy them as a direct consequence of
the penetration. In other words, its aim is not to release nuclear energy in an
uncontrolled manner.
One
important inference that one must make is that DU weapons do not aim to kill by
radiation exposure, but by penetrating the target and then consequently
disabling it. Thus, if persons inside of the target suffer injuries or death it
would be caused by the heat released during the penetration and not directly
because of the DU fragments. Proponents of DU would claim that the loss of
human lives is collateral damage rather than the aim of the attack; thus
avoiding liability.
The
radiation left by the ammunition is a consequence of “the DU-tipped sabot
penetrating a hard object” and consequently exploding because encounter between
the DU munitions and the armor (Mc Donald, Kleffner and Toebes). As the article International Law and Depleted Uranium
Weapons: A Precautionary Approach asserts, “given that there is no
prohibition of nuclear weapons per se, it would be particularly difficult to
consider DU as a nuclear weapon on account of its radioactive properties”. The
secondary release of radiation is not covered by any of these statutes.
Therefore, DU can lawfully be employed in warfare without any restriction.
All
of the previous definitions rely upon the primary purpose of the weapon. The
legality of a weapon relies entirely on the aim for which a weapon was created;
therefore current restrictions do not encompass all weapons such as DU that
have very close properties to the weapons that are banned or restricted. An
approach to ban DU will have to expand the current institutional restriction
placed, given that the secondary effects of DU create harms of equal or greater
than the primary effects.
Although
the transfer and trade of DU weapons are not yet prohibited by international
law, these weapons could more easily be placed under stricter export controls
and licenses. A strong case in favor of stricter controls can be made by
arguing that because DU still holds most of its radioactivity (60%), if the
cargo were to be sequestered by terrorist or any other undesirable party, it
would give them the capacity to produce a low-yield uranium nuclear weapons (Mc Donald, Kleffner and Toebes). This consideration
would urge the IAEA –the institution in charge of controlling the trade and
transfer of DU—to restrict the movement and trade of DU weapons for national
security reasons. If this consideration were to be taken into action, not only
would DU transportation be restricted during conflict time, but it would also
undergo constant surveillance under normal conditions. Both these conditions
would yield higher transportation costs since there will be more bureaucratic
and legal paper work to be completed. Even though this may not deter companies
from completely abandoning the transporting and production of DU munitions, it
would make it more difficult for them to do so.
In
this hypothetical scenario, the reduction of DU munitions throughout the world,
would also force producers to have to store DU over a longer period of time.
The additional restrictions would move up the average cost curve of the
companies employing DU, which raises the price. The higher price would deter
some of the buyers of DU, thus having a negative effect on both demand and
supply curves. Ultimately the higher
price would translate into less DU being used for weapons, which may help
contain the effects of DU until it can be banned altogether.
DU
could also be restricted by following the Law of Armed Conflict. All armed
conflicts are regulated by the rule of “military necessity”. This law restricts
the employment of weapons that cause “superfluous and unnecessary suffering to
the combatants” that are stipulated in the Geneva Conventions and their
Protocols Additional of 1977. Former US attorney General Ramsey Clark, now an
International human rights lawyer, stated: “DU weapons violate international
law because of their inherent cruelty and unconfined death-dealing effect.
[T]hey threaten civilian populations now and for generations to come. And these
are precisely the weapons and uses that have been prohibited by international
law for more than a century” (Beckett 1).
As aforementioned, DU causes harms to the civilians when the resulting dust is
inhaled or when it enters the body through a wound. DU may not necessarily be
perceivable during combat, but since it becomes dust when it hits a target that
radioactive dust falls to the ground and is carried by the wind. Thus, leaving
the surrounding environment with a layer of radioactivity.
The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) addresses the issue of military
environmental hazards under rule 44:
Methods and means of warfare must be employed with
due regard to the protection and preservation of the natural environment.
In the conduct of military operations, all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any
event minimize, incidental damage to the environment. Lack of scientific
certainty as to the effects on the environment of certain military operations does not absolve a party to the conflict
from taking such precautions (Legal Status).
The
U.S. bypasses such laws by going through great lengths to dismiss the harmful
effects of weapons such as DU, in order to limit their liability. Lawfully,
under the ICRC statutes the US, as any other nation that employs
environmentally hazardous weapons, is responsible for the social damage caused
by their means of warfare. The lack of conclusive data discourse allows the
U.S. to go around their social and environmental responsibility they incurred
as a result of the Gulf Wars.
The
evidence that suggests that DU causes higher cancer rates, and other still
unstudied harms to human beings, as well as the environment can be pieced
together by a variety of scientific research and news reports that unveils high
social costs. Some of this information does not reach the general public for
two main reasons. The first, because of the chaos that occurs after a war, for
example GW1 and GW2, in which attention is focused on the politics of the war
and human loss. The second reason is the cover-up that the U.S. government has
employed for decades to release them from liability. For example, when Dr.
Ahmad Hardan – a special advisor for the WHO, the UN, and the Iraqi Ministry of
Health - tried to visit Iraq and make a
study, the “Americans objected” and Dr. Hardan had to abandon his trip (Paulison). Additionally, Dr.
Asaf Durakovic, who at the time experimented with dogs exposed to uranium, said
“the US Veterans Administration asked me to lie about the risk of incorporating depleted uranium in the human
body” (Paulison).
This is a direct interference by the US government in order to suppress and
dismiss their social responsibility not only to their own veterans but the
Iraqi people that suffer from DU poisoning. Dr. Durakovic’s team visited ten
cities and their “preliminary tests showed that the air, soil, and water
samples contained ‘hundreds to thousands of times’ the normal levels of
radiation’” (Paulison). The final testing
could not take place because Dr. Durakovic was warned not to continue his work,
and was later fired, his house was ransacked, and repeatedly received death
threats (Paulison).
There are many similar stories like this one.
From
a pragmatic standpoint a government would not want to augment their existing
expenses. If the U.S. accepts the illegality of DU and its harmful effects, the
government and the people they represent will face tremendous cleanup costs
that would not be cost-effective for any government to uphold. With the current
U.S. debt, the U.S. government will be worse off if they accept this burden.
Therefore, for practicality and applying a utilitarian perspective of
sacrificing some in order to make the majority happy (not elevating taxes in
order cover government expenditure) the U.S. government will continue to deny
the harms associated with Depleted Uranium. Furthermore, denying evidence of
the full effects of DU allows the government to uphold their reputation and
safe face in the critical post-invasion eyes of the international community.
Depleted
Uranium dust is indiscriminant. The inorganic radioactive compound does not
care about race, religion, skin color, gender, or any other way we can classify
human beings. DU can affect anyone and everyone in the area where DU was
employed. According to the Law of armed conflict, due to the
property to indiscriminately affect human beings DU must be banned.
“Between 300 to 800 tons of DU particles and dust [have spread] over the ground
and the water in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq,” as a result of the Gulf Wars (Beckett 2). This situation
results in a direct threat to these populations, to the soldiers, and other
agents that fought in these wars.
Proponents
of DU will base the legality of DU on that fact that no legal prohibiting exist
and that DU fulfills the principle of military necessity.
However,
the posterior developments of DU employment that were previously exposed about
the high cancer rate, deformity of newborn children, and others, demonstrate
the negative effects of DU. To put it simply there is no way to control the
area affected by Depleted Uranium. DU “cannot be controlled in space” for DU
dust is subject to varying environmental externalities” (Beckett 18). The radioactive
dust in the contaminated area expands through wind and water movement. As DU
settles in the ground and infiltrates the land DU’s chemical toxicity enters
the food supply.
The
4.5 billion years half-life of DU renders it even more harmful to the
environment for the radioactivity has a long term effect. The Uranium Medical Research Center (UMRC),
an independent research organization, that came together following Operation
Iraqi Freedom, “found DU in the water, soils, and atmosphere of Iraq as well as
in Iraqi civilians” (Paulison).
The results from their research exhort the world to take up the social
responsibility and cure those affected by DU.
The
civilians that survived the Gulf Wars face the fact that “Iraq’s cities have
been blanketed in lethal particles” and as Japanese professor Dr. Yagasaki calculated
that “800 tons of DU is the atomicity equivalent to 83, 000 Nagasaki bombs” (Paulison). These 800 tons of
DU are currently being transported mainly by air and water and the Iraqi people
are experiencing the damaging repercussions, such as increases in cancer rates,
in newborn deformity and stillbirths. The resulting health hazards are clearly
are a manifestation of the unnecessary suffering to the generations to come,
who now have to pay the price of living in an environment blanketed by DU.
The
countries that decide to employ DU must be willing to accept the present and
future social costs. As the article
Depleted Uranium and International Law exposes “most democratic governments
are not willing to accept the health, environmental, and the resulting
political problems associated with the use of DU” therefore, they have
voluntary determined that due to the immense controversy over the radioactive
effects of DU, they will no longer employ them (Shah 2). This leaves the
“U.S. and Britain [as] the only countries that continue to use it” (Shah 2). Some of the
government that have opted to not stockpile DU are ironically allies of the US
and UK, such as “Germany, Canada, the Czech Republic, Norway, and the
Netherlands, which have foresworn the use of DU weapons” (Shah 2).
A
country that has not only stopped using DU but has also accepted its social
responsibility is Italy:
In March 14, 2000 representatives of the Italian
government announced that they would begin providing medical care for the
Iraqis would had been exposed to depleted uranium, as a consequence of
deliberate actions by the United States and England and the continued refusal
by U.S. and British officials to provide medical treatment protocols (Doug Rokke).
In
taking responsibility of the effects of DU, Italy’s actions suggest that DU
does in fact have adverse effects on the people that are exposed to it. One
must also notice that the Italian government provided “medical care for the
Iraqis,” proving that the research that proposes the adverse effects of DU munitions
are accurate. Italy has also adopted a program by which “Italy agrees to the first ever wide scale
compensation package for DU contaminated veterans” (Timeline).
The program was incorporated in early December 2007, when the Italian Ministry
of Defense provided evidence to the Italian parliament for a second time since
the cancer victims had risen to “77 dead and 312 ill” in Italian troops and
peacekeepers that had served in Kosovo and that were exposed to DU (Timeline). The public pressure
was so strong advocating in favor of compensating the victims that the Italian
Congress passed a “170 million Euro compensation package for veterans suffering
from post-conflict illnesses” (Timeline).
Both
measures taken by the Italian government demonstrate a nation taking social
responsibility for their actions both in the Balkans and GW1. Not only were the
Italians taking care of their own sick and wounded by DU, but also they took
the extra step to provide health care to the Iraqis. This initiative must be
mimicked by the countries that still employ Depleted Uranium.
For now, in the absence of conclusive research on the impact
and effects of Depleted Uranium, observable health effects and risk estimates
have to be based on theoretical considerations on the existing studies for the
effects of radiation exposure; followed by focused research studies capable of
providing direct answers and treatment methods specifically for Depleted
Uranium. There is also a pressing need for epidemiologic research for a more
comprehensive assessment of the effects of DU and its correlation to
war-related illnesses; and for providing insights into possible increases in the
development of chronic multifaceted symptoms or other unexpected health
outcomes.
Further use of these munitions should be precluded by strong
sensible and conscious analysis of the developments at hand. The health and
restitution of the people affected by DU, and future generations that will
incur in the social-costs of the damage that has already been done by it, is
entrenched in producing a binding law that considers a wider concept of
“unnecessary suffering” to include long-term social implications, for banning
weapons employed in warfare. Furthermore, it is apparent that the international
community must produce a compulsory set of global health measures to be
considered prior to deploying any form of weaponry to avoid future violations
against human and environmental health.
In the mean time, the treatment of veterans and affected
civilians should be approached in a multifaceted way, to include and consider
establishing “best practice” principles and studying the different levels of
exposure in order to delineate a base of symptoms of DU so that these can be
easily identified and addressed in effectively treating ill people.
·
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·
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·
Al-Azzawi,
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August 2010. 13 October 2010
<http://phys4.harvard.edu/~wilson/soundscience/Al-Azzawi.pdf>.
·
Beckett,
Jason A. "Intermin Legality: A Mistaken Assumption?" 2004. Chinese
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<http://chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/43.short>.
·
"CWC."
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<http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/download-the-cwc/>.
·
Doug
Rokke, Ph.D. The Health costs of Nuclear Technology. 16 December 1999.
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"Gulf
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2010 <http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12183.html>.
·
ICBUW.
n.d. 29 October 2010
<http://www.bandepleteduranium.org/en/i/77.html#25>.
·
"Legal
Status." 24 February 2010. ICBUW. 26 October 2010
<http://www.bandepleteduranium.org/en/i/63.html>.
·
Mc
Donald, Avril, Jann K. Kleffner and Brigit Toebes. "International Law and
Depleted Uranium Weapons: A Precautionary Approach." 2008. ICBDU.
19 October 2010 <http://www.bandepleteduranium.org/en/docs/41.pdf>.
·
Parrish,
RR. Sci Total Environ. 13 July 2007. 4 November 2010
<http://www.albany.edu/news/pdf_files/Depleted_Uranium_Article.pdf>.
·
Paulison,
Pauline. "Depleted Uranium Another Gift from the Imperialists." 16
November 2006. Countercurrents.org. 31 October 2010
<http://www.countercurrents.org/us-paulinson161106.htm>.
·
Peters,
Scott. "The Gulf War Battlefield Still "Hot" with Depleted
Uranium." Middle East Report 211 (1999): 2-5.
·
Pike,
John. "Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons." 27 April 2005. Global
Security.org. 19 October 2010 <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/int/convention_conventional-wpns_prot-iii.htm>.
·
Research
Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veteran's Illnesses. Gulf War Illness and
the Health of Gulf War Veterans: Scientific Findings and Recomendations.
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Printing Office , 2008.
·
Shah,
Nikhil. Countercurrents.org. 23 October 2004. 10 October 2010
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·
Sullivan,
Andy. Report: 'Gulf War Syndrome' is real. 18-24 November 2008. October
2010
<http://www.theglobalreport.org/?section=archives&cat_id=155&article_id=4928>.
·
"Timeline."
n.d. Ban Depleted Uranium. 19 October 2010
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·
Unit,
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